Rather than seeing their cause in the provocations of the far right, what emerged as a consequence of these disturbances was an official discourse that understood their cause in terms of ethnic segregation and community division. The received wisdom was that the disturbances had been brought about by a 'depth of polarisation' between segregated communities living 'a series of parallel lives ' (see Burnley Task Force Report, 2001; Oldham Independent Review, 2001; Bradford Vision, 2001) . What was needed, therefore, was a new model of integration -'community cohesion' -that emphasised a need for social solidarity and social interaction between ethnic groups at local level, which would, in turn, create an integrated whole (see Cantle, 2001 ). Although multiculturalism was not explicitly singled out as the cause of the disorder in the reports themselves (Rattansi, 2011, pp. 74-75) , the argument for greater integration suggested that British multicultural practice required a thorough re-think. As a result, by 2004 there was increasing acceptance across mainstream opinion (including the progressive left) that rather than encouraging integration, British multiculturalism had, in fact, encouraged social fragmentation.
In April 2004, in a hugely important symbolic move, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) called on the Labour government to end its support for multiculturalism. That Trevor Phillips (Britain's black 'race relations' supremo) had made this call revealed the extent to which multiculturalism had fallen from favour. Up till then the CRE had always been regarded as a bastion of multicultural orthodoxy.
Phillips' call had acquired greater potency in July 2005 after several home-grown Islamist terrorists carried out suicide bombings in London. Right-wing journalist, Melanie Phillips, in her controversial book Londonistan (2006, p. viii) summed up the popular mood:
The attacks had been carried out by home-grown Muslim terrorists, suburban boys who had been educated at British schools and had degrees, jobs and comfortable families. Yet these British boys, who loved cricket and helped disabled children, had somehow been so radicalized within the British society that had nurtured them that they were prepared to murder their fellow citizens in huge numbers and turn themselves into human bombs to do so.
An appalling vista thus opened up for Britain, which has around two million Muslim citizens out of a population of some sixty million. How many more Muslim youths, people wondered, might similarly be planning mass murder against their fellow Britons?
In the weeks that followed, as Tariq Modood (2005) a balance to be 'struck between an "anything goes" multiculturalism on the one hand, which leads to deeper division and inequality; and on the other, an intolerant, repressive uniformity'.
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'We have allowed', Phillips continued, 'tolerance of diversity to harden into the effective isolation of communities, in which some people think special separate values ought to apply'. Finally, in 2006 the Labour government signalled its formal retreat from multiculturalism when Ruth Kelly (2006) , the Labour Government's Communities Secretary declared that Britain had moved away from 'a period of uniform consensus' on multiculturalism.
If there was already recognition that the spatial and social segregation of established minority communities was a pressing problem, particularly so in the case of established Muslim communities, two unprecedented waves of new migration further added to popular anxieties.
The first wave came in the form of asylum-seekers; the second wave took the form of European Union (EU) migrants. Asylum applications had increased dramatically from over 4,000 in 1987 to a peak of over 84,000 in 2002 when asylum applicants and their dependents accounted for 49 per cent of net migration to Britain (Blinder, 2011) . A media panic ensued in which asylumseekers were stigmatised as 'bogus refugees' -supposedly motivated more by economic gain than by any genuine fear of persecution. With Muslim countries constituting some of the leading sources of asylum applicants (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia), there was also a conflation of asylum and Islam in the popular imagination. Moreover, from 2004 onwards, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants from the new EU accession states, even if many shared a common European Christian heritage, called further attention to the fact that Britain had become far more diverse than ever before. The word that was bandied about now was "super-diversity". Yet as Rattansi (2011, p. 146) has observed, "super-diversity" at local level 'put a particular strain on housing, schools, and the health service in some areas, allowing the Far Right an opportunity to intensify anti-immigrant sentiments'.
What is important here, as James Rhodes (2011, p. 69) has already acknowledged, is that the far right located itself 'within a broader oppositional culture towards the politics of multiculturalism' -a culture in which organisations like the BNP appeared less extreme than they did prior to 2001. In other words, with multiculturalism giving cause for criticism amongst the establishment, the extreme right was given space to position its own critique of multiculturalism within mainstream discourse (rather than in total opposition to it). In so doing, Britain's extreme right was able to construct some semblance of legitimacy, particularly so at local level. A key factor in this respect had been the emergence of a parallel narrative amongst white working-class communities that their needs were neglected because the needs of ethnic minorities, and in particular Muslims, were being prioritised. In the wake of the 2001 riots the CRE had already warned the Labour government of growing resentment amongst the white working-class associated with the belief that ethnic minorities received preferential treatment and unequal access to resources. In reality, there was little truth in claims that white communities were being deliberately disadvantaged. However, given the lack of cross-cultural contact between communities such a view tapped into a polarised sense of 'them and us'. Significantly, as we shall see, an emotionally-charged white resentment encouraged a growing trend to vote for the BNP, particularly across Labour-run local authorities. The BNP message -that working-class whites were being discriminated against by a local Labour establishment that took their votes for granted whilst pandering to the ethnic minority vote -chimed with this angry mood of white betrayal and injustice. Across numerous disadvantaged white neighbourhoods, first in NorthWest England and then spreading out elsewhere, the BNP was able to take 'ownership' of working-class 'white backlash'.
AT THE BALLOT BOX: THE ELECTORAL RISE OF THE BRITISH NATIONAL

PARTY
The BNP was originally formed in 1982 as an offshoot from the National Front (NF). The National Front -still in existence today, although of less significance than the BNP -is a farright anti-immigrant party that during the 1970s experienced a surge in popular support, polling nearly a quarter of a million of votes in local elections in 1977 (although it never won any seats in 8 local elections or, for that matter, any seats in any parliamentary elections) (see Taylor, 1982) .
The early electoral history of the BNP, led until 1999 by veteran hardliner John Tyndall, was unremarkable. Between 1982 and 1999, the highest BNP vote share in a general election was a mere 0.1 per cent (in 1997). However, the BNP did capture newspaper headlines for a very brief moment in 1993 when, by projecting itself as a champion of local white residents, campaigning around a theme of 'rights for whites', it captured a local council seat in a ward in East London.
Although this victory did not herald a national breakthrough -the BNP lost this solitary council seat following a strong anti-fascist mobilisation -it served as a model campaign for the party's 'modernisers'. The 'modernisers' looked to build broader support for the BNP through a strategy of embedded neighbourhood politics, through establishing intimate contact with local white voters on the doorstep and by projecting the party as a legitimate defender of local white interests (see Smith, 1998) . This meant dispensing with provocative street demonstrations which, in any case, invited the attention of anti-fascist militants and merely reinforced impressions that the BNP was not a normal political party but an extremist organisation intent on violence.
Nick Griffin, who succeeded John Tyndall as BNP leader in 1999, wanted the BNP to embrace the 'community politics' strategy that the party's modernisers had called for: to mainstream the BNP through an embrace of local community politics and doorstep contact with voters. The strategy was intended to counter the image of 'sieg-heiling' skinheads by presenting the party, on the doorstep, in a non-threatening way. The idea was to create 'cognitive dissonance' amongst voters, that is, a gap between expectation (thuggery) and reality (a smartly dressed canvasser). For the 'modernisers', doorstep canvassing represented the 'trump card': it established intimate contact on people's doorsteps, worked to counteract the BNP's negative image, and demonstrated that the BNP was listening to the concerns of ordinary white voters who felt abandoned and forgotten by an out-of-touch national and local political establishment.
At the same time, the BNP abstained from the type of violent street activity that characterised the NF in its 1970s hey-day. The idea was to disarm militant anti-fascists and remove the BNP's traditional association with the swastika and the jackboot (see Copsey, 2011 ). Griffin's line was that the BNP had to clean up its image, distance itself from Nazism/Fascism and turn itself into an electable party that presented its policies in more moderate 'mainstream' light. This did not mean abandoning core principles but meant talking in non-threatening language which the public felt comfortable with. The focus would be on four 'idealistic, unobjectionable, motherhood and apple pie concepts' (all lifted from the French Front National): 'Freedom, Democracy, Security and Identity' (Copsey, 2008, p. 103) . Under Griffin, the BNP then endeavoured to re-brand itself as a modern, 'popular nationalist' party. Griffin dropped the NF-style call for the forced repatriation of non-whites. He declared that an all-white Britain was now an unrealistic 'utopia' (Griffin realised that forced repatriation was a vote-loser). Nonetheless, even if he was prepared to accept that the BNP could not return Britain to the 'status quo ante 1948' (BNP 2005, p. 20) , that is to say, return Britain to an era before mass immigration, Griffin remained committed to the overarching principle of a white Britain (albeit with some 'salt in the soup', in other words, the presence of some non-whites in British society). Secondly, he redefined the party as a party of 'ethnonationalism' rather than a party of '100 per cent white racial nationalism'. The BNP now referred to its principles as 'ethno-nationalist', that is to say, the British nation was comprised of several 'indigenous' ethnic groups (Anglo-Saxons, Celts, Norse folk communities, and so on) and that these 'indigenous' or 'ancestral' ethnic groups have a right to self-determination in their own territory. 'Being British is more than merely possessing a modern document known as a passport', the BNP's 2010 general election manifesto explained, 'It runs far deeper than that: it is to belong to a special chain of unique people who have the natural law to remain a majority in their ancestral homeland' (BNP, 2010, p. 23) . Inspired by the ideas of the European New Right, Griffin's BNP borrowed from the discourse of multiculturalism -the 'right to difference ' -and argued that the ethnic British had the right to retain their own traditions, culture, heritage and identity without being overwhelmed, threatened or dominated by any other ethnic group (see Copsey, 2013) . The BNP was quick to deny that it was a white supremacist party: 'All peoples, all races, have a right to equal dignity and respect', Griffin's BNP claimed, 'and it is morally incorrect to regard any individual as "inferior" simply because of their racial origin. Any position or argument using that premise', it continued, 'is morally bankrupt as well as politically "unsellable".' 6 Instead of explicitly campaigning against Britain's multi-racial/multicultural society in its entirety, which would only draw accusations of racism and so alienate potential voters, Griffin's BNP now concentrated its fire on a religious creed: Islam. Although multiculturalism was still understood by the BNP in terms of a racial threat, 7 the BNP focused on multiculturalism as a 'religious' and 'cultural' threat, and singled out Muslims as the most visible and threatening manifestation of multiculturalism. According to Griffin, the bombing of the World Trade Center 'didn't just kill some 6,000 people, it also killed multiculturalism':
Gone is fantasy that multiculturalism could be imposed on diverse peoples without creating a fundamental clash of attitudes, interests and ways of life. Gone is the notion that it is possible to import vast numbers of unassimilable foreigners without also importing their quarrels and hatreds. And gone is the naïve belief that Islam is just another religion, or that you can bring large number of its followers into the West without bringing with them the undemocratic, sectarian and confrontational attitudes which are so deeply ingrained in their Holy Book (Griffin, 2001, p. 4) . What then was the root source of dissatisfaction with Labour? The key driver seems to have been the perception that in its quest for a multicultural society, Labour had prioritised immigrant and ethnic minority groups, especially Muslims, at the expense of native white Britons (Goodwin, 2011, p. 107) .
Economic pessimism had also been a factor (BNP voters were the most pessimistic when it came to their views). Moreover, men had been twice as likely to vote BNP as women.
The BNP vote had also been drawn from older social groups. One poll carried out during the European elections in 2009 (YouGov) showed that 44 per cent of BNP voters were from the 35-54 age range, and around two-thirds of BNP voters were from social groups C2 (skilled working class), D (unskilled working class) and E (unemployed). What this data confirmed was that the BNP vote had been rooted in a politically abandoned, and economically insecure, white workingclass. Its vote had come from an electorate that believed that under multiculturalism, white people have suffered unfair discrimination, and that Muslims in particular benefited from unfair advantage. As James Rhodes noted from his study of BNP voters in Burnley (see Rhodes, 2010) , these voters attacked multiculturalism and justified their vote for the BNP by drawing extensively from a discourse of 'unfairness' and 'white victimisation'. But it is important to remember that it is only the presence of a large Muslim community that was associated with higher levels of BNP support. Areas with large black or Indian populations demonstrated no significant effect on BNP voting (Ford and Goodwin, 2010) . In other words, the hostility that was expressed towards multiculturalism from typical BNP voters had been tied to the presence of large Muslim minorities -it should not be understood simply as an expression of the crude racism that underpinned electoral support for the National Front in the 1970s. 'Unlike earlier years', as Ford and Goodwin (2010, pp. 16-17) clarify, 'Indian and black Caribbean minorities are a more established and accepted part of society and do not excite as much white hostility'.
THE ELECTORAL DECLINE OF THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY
Whilst the 'demand' or 'appetite' for an anti-immigrant party that promises to restore white The BNP was then subject to further legal action following an Internet general election broadcast that breached copyright, and in the fall-out, the BNP's website was removed from the Internet just two days before the polling day. To make matters worse for the BNP, in its key target areas local Labour parties worked hard to reconnect with ordinary voters on the doorsteps (especially in Barking and Dagenham). The BNP also faced the most sophisticated electoral antifascist campaign ever (see Copsey, 2012) .
With internal dissent unsurprisingly exacerbated by the frustration of electoral defeat, Griffin indicated that he would be prepared to stand down as party leader at the end of 2013.
However, he could not silence his internal critics. At a leadership contest in July 2011, Griffin won but only just -capturing 50.2 per cent compared to Brons' 49.8 per cent. 'The time for division and disruption is over; now is the time to heal', Griffin announced. 9 Yet the result, as Andrew Brons recognised, was 'the worst mandate the Chairman could win. In effect, the party is split from head to toe…' 10 The BNP haemorrhaged thousands of members (including Brons who became president of an ineffectual BNP splinter group, the British Democratic Party). In 
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ON THE STREETS: THE ENGLISH DEFENCE LEAGUE
With the electoral threat from the extreme-right BNP having apparently receded, the recent and very rapid emergence of a far-right populist street movement -the English Defence League (EDL) -led many commentators to argue that the EDL now represented the greater challenge.
The EDL had originally been formed in the summer of 2009 with its early supporters drawn largely from the football hooligan scene. Unlike the BNP, which under the leadership of Nick
Griffin abstained from provocative street marches, the EDL emphasised confrontational, streetbased activism (see Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Treadwell and Garland, 2011) . As such, it filled the void left by the BNP's abandonment of the streets. By early 2011 the EDL had already held more than 50 demonstrations; many had resulted in public disorder. In July 2013 it was revealed that the total cost of policing EDL demonstrations had exceeded £10 million.
The fear, for some observers, was that EDL incursions into multi-ethnic areas could A report by an independent think-tank, published in 2011, had suggested that the EDL's total active support ranged between 25,000 and 35,000 people (although the largest single demonstration that the EDL has staged has probably involved no more than around 3,000 people) (see Demos, 2011) . This support base compared favourably to the membership of the BNP although it should be noted that the EDL does not possess a paid-up membership as such:
most EDL 'supporters' sign up online through Facebook, which is the group's major organisational and communication medium. All the major towns and cities in England have had active EDL divisions with strongest support located in and around London. and it is important to note the EDL's heritage in football hooliganism -more so than the established far right. The EDL was not a direct product of the BNP or for that matter the NF.
Rather, the EDL's provenance was in several ultra-patriotic 'anti-Jihadist' groups with origins in the football hooligan subculture. This made classifying the EDL 'far right' difficult -a problem not helped by the EDL's nebulous and ill-defined ideology.
The closest the EDL has come to defining an ideology is its Mission Statement. Yet for all its spurious rhetoric about inclusion -reaching out to 'all people' in England, whatever their background or origin, united in their opposition to the 'imposition' of Islam -the EDL remained exclusivist and discriminatory. Non-whites in the EDL constitute a tiny minority.
Nonetheless, their very presence allowed the EDL leadership to deny that the EDL is racist and
to insist that what defines the 'people of England' is not their race but their culture. However, the 'English' culture that the EDL is supposedly defending is a predominantly white culture, the culture of the indigenous (white) English. In the end, it is this visceral urge to restore white ethno-national dominance that positions the EDL on the far right of the political spectrum (even if many EDL sympathisers would not recognise the far-right label, or actively refute it, see Busher, 2013) . Moreover, this visceral urge has occasionally found expression in the explicit language of 'race'. In November 2011, for instance, the EDL released the following statement on their official Facebook page:
In the last 66 years we as a nation, as a race have had our national identity stolen from us by politicians who have forced us to accept multiculturalism. They have and still are practicing cultural genocide on their own people, despite warnings that we will not accept it. They have forced us to accept the dilution of our heritage and history by the implementation of laws which will stop us from rising up, even if that's just to voice an opinion….
And unless we find our backbone and stand up to the ones who are committing crimes against the English people we shall continue to be subjected to slavery by a British elite aided by outside influences whose only intention is to destroy us from within and wipe us out as a race. (Emphasis added). 13 In light of these comments, it is perhaps unsurprising that in early 2012 Nick Griffin commented that, 'Taken as a whole, and whatever the organisation says, it is now in spirit essentially the ethno-nationalist creation that its name always implied'. With doubt, the possibility of violent confrontation with Muslim youth is an obvious driver for some EDL supporters, especially those associated with the football hooligan scene.
Others, however, have been keen to prevent disorder. The major driver that pushes EDL supporters to demonstrate (and many of its online supporters have never attended a demonstration), is a sense of injustice and pessimism about the future. Across white workingclass neighbourhoods buffeted by socio-economic and demographic change, deep alienation remains. Many 'white-have-nots' feel that they a forgotten group. As a Joseph Rowntree 
ALL CHANGE ON THE FAR RIGHT?
With both the BNP and EDL seemingly so near to collapse, does this mean that the challenge from the far right has now fully receded? In certain respects, it would seem so. Yet as Goodwin and Evans (2012, p. 29) explain, When faced with dismal prospects, the tendency is for parties to turn in on themselves, and inhabit increasingly self-referential versions of political and social reality. Such a context may provide fertile ground for the growth of more extremist and combative forms of 'direct action', especially among an inner and more belligerent core of followers. This being said, the threat from violent far-right extremism, whilst it clearly exists, should not be exaggerated. In the first place, differences exist between those perpetrators (or would-be perpetrators) of extreme-right wing terror, and perpetrators of Al Qa'ida-related terrorist activity.
Aside from the fact that there are substantially more terrorist offenders associated with violent white residents felt that they were being treated unfairly, and that Muslims, in particular, had unfair advantage in the competition for scarce resources. This created space for the far right to project itself as vehicle for white working-class resentment. Meanwhile, the BNP had taken measures to 'normalise' itself as an ordinary political party and this enabled it to step into the void created by a growing political divide between the Labour Party and its traditional white working-class constituency.
That said, the retreat from multiculturalism by the British political elite should not be overestimated. Much of this retreat has been rhetorical rather than a practical rejection of cultural diversity per se. The search for new forms of integration, which in turn led to an official emphasis on 'community cohesion', has not occasioned some impulsive rush towards assimilation, but rather to an encouragement of greater inter-cultural dialogue. Moreover, the very absence of a far-right party of the electoral strength of some continental European counterparts (such as the French National Front) seems to suggest that British multiculturalism has been more a success than a failure.
Electorally, the extreme right in Britain is on the decline and there are clear limitations to the extent to which the English Defence League can break through into the mainstream. Survey work has demonstrated that as long as it remains associated with violence there is a 'firewall' between the EDL and mainstream society (see Lowles and Painter, 2011) . But it should not be forgotten that the potential reservoir of support for a far-right populist party remains significant. As we have seen, it is within white working-class communities in particular, that resentment towards multiculturalism and immigration runs deepest. So if there has been a 'failure' of multiculturalism, this is where multiculturalism has 'failed' -the British multicultural project forgot about those parts of the white population that felt abandoned, discriminated against, and victimised. We have made the point that it was this part of the population that was most drawn to the extreme right. Moreover, it is this part of the population that still remains worryingly receptive to the far-right message that growing ethnic diversity is a serious threat to British society (even if the standard-bearer of that message no longer carries the red, white and blue of the BNP but the purple and yellow of UKIP).
